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MARXET STRUCTURE  •  STRIKE ACTIVITY •  AND  UNION WAGE SETTLEXENTS 
Abstract 
We  attempt  a synthesis  of  the  industrial  relations  market  structure  hypothesis 
with the modern  asymmetric  infonsation  theory  of  wage and strike  outcomes.  The 
industrial  relations  literature  contains  a  variety  of arguments indicating  that wage 
settlements  should  be positively  related to the degree  of product  market sales 
concentration  and the degree of  product  market  coverage  by  the union.  An  asymmetric 
information  bargaining  model is specified  that relates  these same variables to strike 
probabilities  as well as wage settlements. 
Our empirical  analysis is conducted  for the periods  from 1970-1980 (strikes)  and 
1976-1980  (wages).  We find that the relation  between  trade-adjusted  sales 
concentration  and wage settlements  is positive  at low levels  of concentration  hut 
negative  at high levels  of concentration. The relation  is always  negative  for strike 
probabilities. We also find that  the relation  between the trade-adjusted  percent of 
the product  market  covered  by the same union and the percentage  covered  by  other union 
are positively  related to both wage settlements  and strike  probabilities. Our 
empirical  analysis  includes  a  rich set  of  controls  including  unrestricted  time and 
industry  effects,  which do not affect the major conclusions. 
John H. Abowd  Joseph  S. Tracy 
NYSSILR  & JOSH  Department  of Economics 
Cornell  University  Yale University 
Ithaca,  NY  14851-0952  New Haven,  CT  06520 I. Introduction 
The market structure  hypothesis in the industrial  relations  literature  postulates 
that  unions should  have the greatest  power  when they are effectively  organized in 
noncompetitive  industries. According to this  hypothesis,  two key determinants  of  the 
level of  union wages are the firm's  "ability  to pay" and the union'a "ability  to 
appropriate". In  this paper we empirically  test these  predictions  by  incorporating 
measures  of the market  structure  ard the bargaining  structure  in  both union wage 
settlement  and strike  equations.  We also introduce  a modern  asymmetric information 
theory  that predicts  the effects  of market  and bargaining  structure  variables  on 
strike  probabilities  and wage settlements. The information  asymmetry  model is used to 
resolve  some of the anomalies in the estimated  equations  that are not consistent  with 
the market  structure  hypothesis. 
The market  structure  hypothesis  can be traced  back to John R. Commons'  (1909) 
discussion  of  the  American  Shoemakers)  Commons  argued  that prior to the Civil War, 
the dynamics  of  the  shoemaker's  trade  union movement  was driven  by market  developments 
and not by  technological  developments  (j,. changes in  the footwear  production  process 
itself).  The modern formulation  of  the market  structure  hypothesis  evolved  out of  two 
long standing  empirical  observations  concerning  union wage determination. Ross and 
Gardner (1950)  and Segal (1961)  demonstrated,  using aggregate  data,  that union wage 
levels  are increasing  in the  level of  unionization  and in  the level of  sales 
concentration  in the industry.  A theoretical  literature  developed that  attempted to 
rationalize  these empirical  findings  (See  Garbarino (1950)  and Schlesinger (1958)). 
The  hypothesis  was not without its critics,  however.  Rees (1962)  argued  that the 
hypothesis  had no  clear theoretical  foundation  and that  the  empirical evidence  in its 
support  was inconclusive. While a noncompetitive  market  structure  may increase  the 
firm's  ability  to pay,  Rees pointed  out that it may also increase  the firm's incentive 
to resist  unionism.  The fact that the oligopolistic  industries  were the last to be 
1We are grateful  to Peter Cappelli  for this citation, 
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organized  is consistent  with this argument.  Finally,  Fees also claimed  that the 
existing  empirical  studies  failed  to document  an independent  effect  of concentration 
on  union wages.  These studies  examined  only the manufacturing  sector  where 
concentration  and union coverage  have a  strong  positive correlation.  To he 
convincing.  Fees felt that studtes  should  also include  the  nonmanufacturing  sector 
since  the correlation  between  concentration  and coverage is weaker in that sector.  He 
concluded that ".,. in my  judgemenr,  data for tha whole country  would be much less 
likely  than  data for  manufacturing  alone to show strong association  between 
unionization,  enterprise  monopoly,  and wage increases."  (1962,  pp.  133)  Further  doubt 
was cast on  the hypothesis  by  Lewis (1963),  Weiss (1966),  and Rosen (1969)  who found a 
negative  union wage coefficient  on  the interaction  between  coverage  and concentration. 
Fees'  critique led to a  series of  papers that developed  and refined  the market 
structure  hypothesis (See  Livernash (1963),  Segal (1964),  and Levinaon (1967)). 
However,  few empirical tests of  these newer  models  have been carried  out (See 
Hendricks (1975),  Kwoka (1983),  and Mishel  (1986)).  This paper adds to this empirical 
literature  in  many important  respects.  A  unique feature  of our analysis  is that  we 
examine  the effects  of  market  and bargaining  structure  on  both union wage settlements 
and strike  activity.  This iS the first systematic  empirical analysis  of the effects 
of these  variables on  strikes.  We  have also  expanded the typical  specification  to 
include  several  new variables. Union coverage  rates  are  adjusted to  reflect the 
nonunion  labor component  embodied  in imported  goods.  Overall  union coverage in the 
industry  is disaggregated  into coverage  by  the  union representing  the bargaining unit 
and coverage  by  all other  unions.  In addition,  we disaggregate  nonunion coverage  into 
domestic and foreign  components.  Finally,  the  importance  of a  particular industry  to 
the  union's overall  unionization  pattern is measured  by  the percentage of the  union's 
total  membership that is in that industry. 
Our findings  are  briefly summarized  as follows.  First,  consider strike  incidence 
rates at  the time  of  contract  expiration.  There is a  weak negative relation  between S 
trade-adjusted  industry  four firm  sales concentration  ratioa  and strike  incidence. 
There is a strong  positive relation  between the  trade-adjusted  coverage  by  the union 
involved  in the negotiation  and strike incidence  and  a  weaker  positive relation 
between  the trade-adjusted  coverage  by  other unions in the industry  and strike 
incidence.  laport  penetration  is associated  with lower strike  incidence  rates.  A 
Herfindahl  index of  the  extent  of  coapetitive  unionism in the industry  is also 
negatively  associated  with strike  incidence  rates.  There is a strong  nonlinear 
relation  between the percent  of  the  inion's  total membership in the industry  and 
strike  incidence,  increases  in this variable are  associated  with lower strike 
incidence  at low levels  and  higher  strike incidence  at  high levels.  Bargaining  units 
that are part of Association  Agreements  are less likely  to  strike.  Otherwise, strike 
incidence  rates are not very different  among the various  bargaining structures.  The 
statistical  precision  of  the estimated  strike incidence  effects is lower  when 
unrestricted  year and industry  effects  are included  in the analysis;  however, the 
qualitative  pattern  of the results  is the same. 
Second,  consider  wage settlements. Our findings  here are consistent  with the 
pattern  of complicated  nonlinear  relations  previously  reported.  Real wage settlements 
increase  at a decreasing  rate as the trade-adjusted  four firm sales concentration 
increases;  however the  interaction  of sales concentration  with both aeasurea  of  union 
coverage (own and other union)  is negative.  The sign of the marginal  effect  depends 
upon  whether unrestricted  industry  effects  are also estimated,  Real wage settlements 
increase  at decreasing  rate as trade-adjusted  coverage  by  the same union (or  by  other 
unions  in the same industry)  increases.  The sign of the marginal  effect  does not 
depend  upon specification. The marginal  effect  of increased import  penetration  on 
real  wage settlements  is specification  dependent.  Real wage settlements  increase  as 
the  Herfindahl index of union concentration  increases.  There is also a nonlinear 
relation  between the percent  of a  union's total membership  in  the industry  and the 6 
real wage settlements.  The marginal effect  of increases  in this measure is positive 
at low levels and negative  at high levels  for all specifications 
Ii, The  Market Structure Hypotheses 
The  reformulation of the  market  structure hypothesis  in the 1960's  is presented 
in a  clear fashion  in  Craypo (l9g6)  This summary  draws heavily on that presentation. 
The  central  feature this reformulation is  the emphasis  given  to  the need  for  the uncn 
to be  effectively organired so that it is  in a pcaition to  appropriate some of the 
noncompetitiva  rents  that  may exist in the industry.  The union's overall success  in 
raising the  level of vages  for its members  depends  both on  the ability cf firma  to  pay 
as well as  the ability ci  the union to  make  the  firm pay.  This  addressee the 
of Race'  theoretical  critique of earlier formulations of the hypothesis. 
The ability  of  the firm to  pay wage premis to its employees is derived  froa its 
ability to  pass on  higher labor  costs and its ability  to offset  higher labor coats 
through  reductions  in other production  costs.  The degree to  which the firm can shift 
the incidence  of  wage preaia to  other agents in the economy  is determined  by  four 
factors:  the level of concentration  in the industry;  the extent of  "spatial 
limitation"  that exits in the product  market;  whether the firm is in a regulated 
industry;  and the importance  of government  contracts  and subsidies  in the industry. 
Firms that exercise  considerable  market  power in  an  industry  can finance  wage 
premia out of the rents generated  by  nonmarginal  coat  pricing.  In this case,  the 
incidence  of the  wage premia  can  be  thought  of as  being shifted  in part onto consumers 
through  higher  prices.  However, the  wage premia  may instead  simply  reflect  a transfer 
of rents from the firm's  equity  holders to the  union members  with no  significant 
change  in the  product price occurring.  This  would be  the case if the union contract 
reflected  a  bargaining outcome  on a  vertical contract  curve±  Empirical  evidence 
2This is the "strong  efficiency"  bargaining  outcome  as described in Brown 
and Ashenfelter  (19g6).  See Abowd (1987)  for evidence  that unexpected changes 
in  the value of a  union contract  generate  on  average  dollar for dollar suggests  that there is a  nonlinear relation  between concentration  and profitability 
(See Scherer (1980)).  Marginal increases  in  concentration  do not lead to significant 
increases  in  profitability  until the industry  becomes  highly concentrated. 
Consequently,  we might expect  that there will exist a nonlinear  relation  between 
concentration  and union wages and  between concentration  and strike  activity. 
There are several  problems  in using the four firm sales concentration  data as 
published in the Census  of Manufacturing. First,  only sales of  domestically  produced 
goods are included  in the concentr  don  calculation. Variations in the level  of 
concentration  across  industries  at a  point in time or  within an  industry  across time 
may not accurately  reflect  variations  in market  power due to cross-sectional  and 
time-series  variation in  import  penetration.  Second,  concentration  figures  may 
overstate  the degree  of market  power in  those industries  characterized  by a few large 
buyers  of  the industry's  output.3  In this situation,  much of  the noncompetitive  rent 
may  be  appropriated  by  buyers of  the product  through  price discounting.  Finally,  the 
unadjusted  concentration  figures  do not take into account  possible  spatial limitations 
of the  product market  or patent  protection  for specific  product  lines.4 
The Federal  government  has played  an important  role in  collective  bargaining in 
two respects.  Government  regulation  of an  industry  may increase  a firms  ability to 
pay wage premia by  allowing the firm to pass through  any increase  in labor  costs in 
the form of a  rate increase.  Regulation,  then,  helps to take  the  wage "out of 
competition". Examples include  the trucking,  railroad,  airline,  and telephone 
industries.  Recent  deregulation  of  many of  these industries  provides a  natural test 
transfers  between equity  holders  and union  members. 
3An example is the tire and tube  industry. 
4The newspaper industry  is an example  of an industry  with spatially 
limited  product markets.  Within the industry,  the degree  of concentration  is 
quite low,  although  within  a city,  the degree  of concentration  is typically 
quite high.  The pharmaceutical  industry  is an example  of an industry in  which 
the level of concentration  is low although  firms may earn noncompetitive 
returns on individual  patented  drugs.  Weiss (1966)  developed  an  adjusted 
concentration  series  that incorporated  these  concerns. B 
of  this model by  generating  a  before and after regulation  act of union  wages.  Rose 
(1987)  provides a careful  and detailed  analysis  of the total reduction  in  regulatory 
tents in the trucking  industry  and the distribution  of  this loss  between trucking 
firma and the  Teamster  Union,  Industries  that do a significant  amount of  contract 
work for the  Government may also be in  a  better position  to finance  wage premia.  A 
"cost-plus'  contract  allows  the firm to pass on  to the government increases  in overall 
labor  costs.  Examples  include  the aerospace  industry. 
In addition  to rent-sharing  or shifting  the incidence  of labor cost increases 
onto consumers  or the government,  firms can attempt  to offset  higher  union wages 
through increases in labor productivity.  This can take place through  improvements  in 
the capital stock and/or elimination of union work rules.  Both lead to larger totel 
rents, which can be used to finance  the labor  costs. 
As Rams pointed  out,  noncompetitiwe  market structures  are not a sufficient 
condition  for  high union wage levels.  The  union must also be "effectively  organized" 
so as to  be  able to  make the firm  pay a  wage premis.  Three factors  that govern  the 
ability  of the union to appropriate  rents  are the  extent to  which the  union has 
organized  the "relevant"  work force;  the absence  of "competitive  unionism" in  the 
industry;  and whether  the union has put in place the "appropriate"  bargaining 
structure. 
Ocganizscion  of the relevant  work force allows  the  union to take the wage out  of 
competition. What constitutes  the "relevant"  work force  will vary  by  industry  and 
occupation.  Craft unions  need to  organize  all skilled  workers and try  and regulate 
the acquisition  of  the skills by  new workers.  In  contrast,  industrial unions  need to 
organize  each production facility  in  order to prevent  firms from shifting output  among 
plants  during  strikes,  Similarly,  regional  redistribution  of  production must  be 
offset by  new ocganization  drives.  The rise  of  the  mini-mill  steel companies in  the 
South is an  example  of  this  problem. 9 
Spatial  considerations  are also important  for defining the relevant  work force. 
If the  product  market is spatially  limited  or a  key aspect of  the production  process 
is spatially  limited,  then,  the union need not organize the  entire  work force. 
Levinaon  (1967)  introduced  the notion  of spatial  limitation. 
"Under  this  type of industrial  structure,  the union need only achieve a  high 
degree  of organizational  strength  within the limited  strategic areas 
involved  in order to be protected  against  the undermining  effects  of  new 
nonunion  entrants or of runaway  shops,  irrespective  of  how easy entry into 
the  industry  itself  might  be." (p. 202) 
For example,  longahoring  unions need only organize  a few seaports  rather  than the 
entire  shipping  process to  he  effectively  organized. A second  example  is the 
construction  industry  where the relevant  work force is defined at a local  level. 
In addition to organizing the relevant  work force,  effective  unionism requires 
that the structure  of  the organization  is not fragmented  between competing  unions. 
Craypo (1986)  distinguishes  between  competitive  unionism  and "rival"  unionism. 
Competitive  unionism  refers  to two or more unions  that work against  each other in 
economic  bargaining because  they represent  parts of the same relevant  work force,  In 
contrast,  rival unionism  refers  to two or  more unions  that represent  different 
relevant  groups  of  workers  within the same firm  or  industry. 
An  example  of the problems  inherent  in  a fragmented  bargaining structure  is the 
post-war  experience of the electrical  workers  at General  Electric (GE).  In 1946 the 
United  Electrical  Workers (UE) union  was involved  in  a two month strike  with GE  in an 
attempt  to force GE  to  match wage increases  that had been negotiated in the auto and 
steel industries.  In  response to this costly  strike,  GE adopted  a take-it-or-leava-ic 
bargaining  philosophy  that has since been named after its originator  Lemuel  Boulware. 
The firm  marketed its "fair,  firm" offer directly  to its  workers rather  than going 
through  the  unions. 
The practice  met with considerable  success  during  the 1950's  in part due to the 
fragmentation  that  was taking  place in the structure  of the electrical  workers union 
coverage.  In 1949  UE  ceased  paying  dues to the Congress  of  Industrial  Unions (GIG) 10 
because  of a charge that its 1eadershp was communist-dominated  and because of the 
taiding  of its bargaining  units by  other Gb  unions.  UE  was later expelled from the 
GIG,  which chartered the International  Union of  Electrical  Workers (tUE)  to replace 
UE.  In  addition,  the  American Federation  of  Labor (AFL)  chartered  the International 
Brotherhood  of Electrical  Workers (IEEW).  These two competing  unions  ma well as other 
unions  were successful in  winning GE  bargaining  unita away from UE.  The end result 
was that GE  workers were  represented by thirteen ucicns with over  60  contracts 
GE  took  full advantage  of its noniotegrated croduction  process as well  as  the 
degree of fragmentation  in the union representation.  The  company would  iaolete  the 
union  that it felt was  the moat in  need  of e settlement and  offer it a contract just 
marginally better than  the "firm, fair" contract heng offered in general.  GE  would 
pressure the  uhion into  a settlement by  arguing  that the union  could not  win a strike 
on  its own.  Gnce a settlement  was reached,  GE  would present the settlement  tO all of 
the other  uoiona as the  best they could  hope to  negotiate.  This tactic  put the  unions 
on the  defensive  and  gave  the bargaining initiative  to  GE.  Aa a result,  GE was 
successful fn hreakng  away from  general settlement patterns in other industries 
organized  by  the GIG.  The average  wage at GE fell from 9E% of the average in  durable 
manufacturing in  1947  to  91%  in 1964.  The end  of GE's bargaining strategy came in 
1969 when a Federal  Appeals  Gourt upheld an  unfair  labor  practice charge against  GE  by 
finding  that "Boulwareimm"  constituted  a  violation  of the "duty to bargain in good 
faith". 
The  third factor in  determining  the effectiveness  of a  union's organization  is 
the bargaining  structure  used by  the union.  The appropriate  bargaining structure  will 
depend  on the structure  of  the product  market  and/or  production  process.  Ideally,  the 
bargaining mtructure  should be  broad enough to cover all workers  whose products  are 
sold in  competition. This does not require that  a  single  contract cover all of  these 
workers.  Strong  settlement  patterns  may serve  as  a  substitute for a  common  contract 
4l8  F.2d 736 (2d Cir.  1969),  cert.  denied,  397 U.S. 965 (1970). 11 
(See  Livernash (1963)).  There are two advantages  that are derived  by  a  union from 
having  the appropriate  structure. 
"Because  the  relevant  work force  includes  workers  producing goods or 
services that sell  in competition,  a  union aim is to expand  the  bargaining 
structure  or pattern to include  them all to obtain  the greatest  union impact 
during  strikes.  Bargaining structures  should  be sufficiently  centralized  to 
ensure that economic terms and conditions  affecting  the relevant  work force 
are negotiated  at the  same  time.  This structure  removes the relevant  work 
force from economic  competition."  (Craypo  (1986).  p.  34) 
One counter  balancing  factor is that  as the bargaining  structure  broadens, the union 
is faced  with representing  a more eterogeneous work force,  This can make it  more 
difficult  for the union to obtain  a consensus  on  priorities in bargaining  and more 
difficult  for the union to maintain  cohesiveness  during economic  strikes. 
III. Recent  Empirical  Evidence  on  the  Market  Structure  Iypothesis. 
The two most comprehensive  empirical  studies  of the relation  between  market 
structure,  bargaining  structure,  and union wages are  Hendricks (1975)  and Mishel 
(1986).  g0th studies  use disaggregate  data and control  for a variety  of measures  of 
the level and structure  of unionism,  Hendrick's  data consist of contract  level 
observations  for  450 firms.  Contracts  were included  in the analysis  if the contract 
listed  the wages for specific  occupational  groups.  The sample  period is from 1970 to 
1971.  Mishel's  data is gathered  from the 1968,  1970, and 1972 Expenditure  for 
Employee  Compensation  (EEC)  Surveys.  An  establishment  was included in the analysis  if 
at least 50% of  the workers  were unionized.  The wage data consist  of  the  average 
total compensation  for production  workers at the establishment. Hendricks estimates 
an  error components  model allowing  for a firm-specific,  a year-specific,  and an 
idiosyncratic  error term.  Mishel  uses ordinary  least squares in  his estimation, 
The degree of  noncompetitiveness  in the  product  market is proxied in each study 
by  indicator  variables for "medium"  and "high"  levels  of  sales concentration. The 
sales concentration  figures  have been adjusted  to reflect  spatial limitations  in the 12 
production  process or the product  market.6  Hendricks  interacts  concentration  with 
union  coverage  while Mishel interacts  concentration  (and a measure of  barriers ro 
entry)  with bargaining structure  variables.  Both studies include  additional controls 
for  other features  of the firm and/or  product  market.  Hendricks includes  a  measure oi 
the  ratio of  labor cost to total cost and a  measure of firm sire,  Mishel includes  a 
subjective  barriers to entry measure  a measure of the industry price-cost  aargin,  and 
the level  and growth in the industry import penetration ratio.7 
Hendricks  finds  a significant  positive  relation  between concentration  and wages 
for  janitors,  laborers, elsctricians,  and painters.  A  negative and significant 
relation  was found for  aechancs.  Across  all occupation  categories,  the higher  the 
ratio of  labor costs to total costs the lower the obsen'ed  wage level.  As observed  iv 
individual  worker data, the size ef the firm  had s significant and positive effect on 
wage levels.  Mishel also finds a positive  and  nonlinear relation between 
concentration and wages.  High concentration  (60 
-  100%)  has  neatly  three  times  the 
effect  as  medium concentration  (40  - 60%).  Higher  levels  of  import  penetration  in an 
industry  significantly  lower  wages,  although  changes  in the level of import  activity 
had no effect.  No stable  pattern  of effects  for the  battier to entry measures  or  the 
price-cost  measure were found.  The discussion  of the interactions  with concenttations 
will  be  given  below, 
The ability  of the union to make the firm  pay is measured  with a  variety of 
variables  in each study.  This is the  major contribution  of  the two studies.  Previous 
research  focused  on a single  dimension  of unionism  -  -  the level of  coverage in the 
industry/region/occupation.  Hendricks  includes  indicators  for the type of  bargaining 
structure  for the contract  being negotiated.  Four different  structures  are identified 
6See Weiss (l966b)  "Appendix  to  Concentration  end Labor Earnings."  mimeo. 
7The price-cost  margin is  defined  as (Value  Added  -  Payroll 
expense)/(Value  of Shipments)  using data from the  Annual Survey  of 
Manufactures.  Import  penetration  is defined  as Imports/(Impotts  +  Value  of 
Shipments). 13 
in  the data:  single  firm/single  plant;  single  firm/multiple  plant; local 
multi-employer;  and industry-wide. Since Mishel  used establishment  level instead  of 
contract level  data, he  only controlled  for  the bargaining  structure at the industry 
level.  The two specifications  used in  the analysis  are the percent of  workers in  each 
type of  bargaining structure  and the dominant  mode of bargaining.  Mishel  also 
addresses  the issue of the degree  of competitive  unionism  in  an industry.  Both the 
number of unions  in the industry,  the percent  organized  by  the  largest  union,  and a 
Herfindahi index of coverage  are incorporated  into the specification.  Each study 
allows  the level of union coverage to have a  nonlinear  effect on  wages.8 
Consistent  with earlier  studies  using aggregate  data and micro data on individual 
workers, the level of union coverage  has a significant  and positive effect  on wage 
rates.  Mishel  finds that the largest  effect is in  the range of  coverage  between 60 - 
80%.  There  is  no  difference  between  the effect of  coverage in the range 40 -  60%  and 
the range 80 - 100%.  Hendricks  finds  that increasing  the level of  concentration 
(holding  constant  the level of union coverage)  raises  wages only when a  high level of 
coverage  exists.  With both moderate and low  coverage  levels the interaction  is 
negative  as found in  previous  aggregate studies.  This provides  supports for Rees' 
criticism that concentration  per se need not lead to higher  wages.  Mishel finds that 
the composition  of coverage is important  as  well as the level of  coverage. 
Controlling  for overall  coverage, increasing  the  share of  the dominant  union leads  to 
higher  wages.  Similar results  were found  when the  Herfindahl index was substituted 
for the dominant  union share.  This evidence  supports  the claim that competitive 
unionism  reduces  the overall  effectiveness  of  unions. 
Contrasting  results are found for the effect  of  centralization  of  bargaining. 
Hendricks finds  for  most occupation  groups  that local multi-employer  bargaining is 
associated  with the  highest  wage settlements. The second  most effective  structure is 
8Union  coverage is defined  as the percent  of production  workers in an 
industry  organized  by  any union. 14 
firm  level bergaining.  Single  plant and industry-wide  bargaining  are associated  with 
lower wages with the lowest  settlements  associated  with industry-wide  units.  In 
contrast,  Hishel finds that wages increase  in general  with centralization. Mishel 
also finds that union workers receive  higher  wages in more concentrated  product 
markets  regardless of the type  of  bargaining structure  in  place. 
Interpretation  of  these empirical  findings  regarding  the effects  of  bargaining 
structures  on  wage outcomes is made difficult  by  the  fact that  bargaining structures 
are  both an  outcome  of  the  bargaining  process  as well as  a determinant  of  the 
bargaining  process,  Unions and firms may value particular  bargaining structures 
independent  of their effect  on future  wage settlements.  For example,  more centralized 
structures  provide scale  economies  in  the costs of  contract negotiation  and 
administration  while decentralized  structures  provide  more local  autonomy.  The wage 
effects  discussed  above could  be interpreted  as compensating  differentials  for 
different  bargaining structures. 
A few empirical  studies  have examined  the role of  bargaining structures  as 
outcomes  of  the bargaining  process.  Deaton  and Beaumont (1980)  examine the 
determinants  of  bargaining  structure  using British  data while Hendricks and Kahn 
(1982)  use U.S.  data.  Several  of  the variables  used in  our wage specifications  (j,.,. 
sales concentration)  were found  to be important  predictors of  bargaining structure. 
This may make it  difficult for the data precisely  to determine independent  effects  of 
bargaining  structure  and variables  such as sales concentration  on  wages.  However, 
there is no necessary  statistical  bias in  the coefficient  estimates themselves. 
The situation that  would lead to statistical  bias occurs  when the error in the 
wage (or strike)  equation is correlated  with  the bargaining structure  variables.  For 
example,  if "strong"  unions (or  firms)  can negotiate  both their  desired  bargaining 
structure  and more favorable  compensation  terms,  then  our bargaining structure 
coefficients  would no  longer  measure the  independent  effect of  bargaining structure  on 
wages.  Correcting for this  excluded  variable  bias would require  using predicted 15 
rather  than actual  measures  of  the bargaining  structure.  However, there seems to  be 
no proclivity as to which direction  this bias would take.  Livernash (1963)  writes 'On 
the other  hand,  single-employer  bargaining  may prevail  because  of  union inability to 
organize  the total product  market.  Inability to organize  has in recent  years 
essentially  destroyed  both multiemployer  bargaining and  unionism in  hoisery  and 
textiles.  Single-employer  bargaining also  exista as a deliberate  union choice  were 
pattern-setting  and -following  tdd to  union strength in negotiating  with a relatively 
small number of large  employers.  Single-employer  bargaining thus appears  both as a 
sign of  union weakness (inability  to organize)  and as a sign of union strength" (p. 
13). 
Given that there is no definite  direction  of the  potential bias,  we will follow 
the previous empirical  literature  and include  actual  rather  than predicted  measures  of 
bargaining structure  in the wage and strike  equations.  This will facilitate 
comparisons  of our results  with this literature. 
IV.  Introducing  Strikes  into the  Market Str'.icture  Hypothesis 
The final problem to consider  before  the empirical  analysis  is the role of 
strikes  in  the market  structure  hypothesis. Modern strike  models  rely on  an 
information  asymmetry  or signalling  structure  in order to accommodate  disputes as part 
of an economically  rational  bargaining  process.9  To model the implications  of  the 
market  structure  hypothesis  for strikes  we consider  a very simple  asymmetric 
information  model in  which the employer  has perfect  information  about quasi-rents  per 
worker,  which are defined as the difference  between  net revenues and the  alternative 
wage rate of  union labor,  but the union only knows the  distribution  of these 
quasi-rents.  In the appendix  we derive  the implications  of  a single  round  bargaining 
problem for  wage settlements  and strike  probabilities. These conclusions  can be 
9See  Tracy (1987)  and references  therein  for a summary  of these models 
and a test of their implications  of for strike  incidence  and duration. 16 
summarized  as follows.  There  are three types  of  parametric  information to vary:  the 
expected  level of  net revenues  per worker,  the  dispersion in  net revenues  per worker, 
10  and the alternative  wage rate.  Increasing  expected  net revenues  per worker, hci.dtng 
the dispersion  of  net revenues  per worker  and the alternative  wage rate constant, 
increases  the wage settlement (there  is more to divide)  and decreases the strike 
probability  (there  is a  greeter  cost to  disagreement). Increasing the dispersion  in 
net revenues  per worker,  holding the expected  value and alternative  wage rate 
constant,  increases  the wage settlement  (the optimal  offer increases)  and increases 
the strike  probability  (the higher  offer is less likely  to  be  accepted  by  the firm). 
Finally,  increasing  the alternative  wage rate,  holding  the distribution  of  net 
revenues  constant,  increases  wage settlements  and strike  probabilities  (because  labor 
market  opportunities  outside  of  the bargaining  unit are better). 
In  order to integrate  the market structure  hypothesis  into this simple asymmetric 
information  model we must relate  the key market  structure  variables (sales 
concentration,  union  coverage,  and bargaining  structure)  to the parametric information 
in the model.  All of  the arguments in  the literature  suggest  that increased sales 
concentration  is intended  as a  proxy for increased  quasi-rents  per worker.  This 
implies  that increases in  sales concentration  should  be  associated  with incressed  wage 
settlements  and decreased strike  incidence.  The arguments  in  the literature also 
suggest  that the increased  product  market  coverage  by  the  union is associated  with an 
increased  opportunity  cost of  time for the  members of the  bargaining  unit.  This 
implies  that increases in  product  market  coverage  by  the union involved in the 
negotiation  should  be associated  with increased  wage settlements  and increased  strike 
10Quasi-rents,  in  this model,  are defined  as the difference  between 
revenues  net of  all variable  costs except  labor and labor costs evaluated at 
the alternative  wage rate.  Therefore,  quasi-rents  per worker  are uncertain 
from the union viewpoint (because  of  the uncertainty  about net revenues  per 
worker)  but are fully known from the firm viewpoint.  When the alternative 
wage rate is held constant,  varietion  in  the parsmetric  distribution  of net 
revenues is equivalent  to variation in  the parametric  distribution  of 
quasi-rents  per worker. 17 
incidence.  The literature  contains  diverse  arguments  about the role of product  market 
coverage  by  other uniona  and bargaining  structure  variables.  It ia clear that moat 
researchers  regard these measures  as related  to the labor market alternatives  of the 
union  workers; however, the direction  of that relation  is unclear.  This impliea  that 
changes  in product  market coverage  by  other unions (and other competitive  or  rival 
union  measures) should affect  the  wage settlement  and strike  incidence  rates in the 
same direction. 
Finally,  the literature is  not replete  with arguments that relate  market 
structure  variables to measures  of  uncertainty  about quasi.rents  per worker.  We will 
develop  some of our own.  Incresses  in  uncertainty  should increase  wage settlements 
and strike  incidence  rates. 
It is important  to note that while the information  asymmetry  or  signalling  model 
of  strikes is the only economically  rational  model of  both strikes  and wage 
settlements  in  current use,  it does make some strong  predictions  that are potentially 
refutable.  In  the context of the present  paper,  however,  we  use this model only to 
help interpret  the strike  probability  and  wage settlement  estimates produced  by market 
structure  and union coverage  variables,  Hence,  variables that  have the same effect on 
both the  wage settlement  and strike  probability  equations  may be  interpreted  as 
affecting  either  quasi-rent  uncertainty  or alternative  wage rates in the direction 
required  to  produce the common  effect.  Variables  that have opposite  effects  on  the 
wage settlement  equation  and the strike  equation  must  be  intetpreted  as affecting the 
expected  size of quasi-tents  pet worker  in the appropriate  direction,  No direct 
evidence  of  the relations  among the market  structure,  union coversge,  bargaining 
structure,  quasi-rents  per worker  or alternative  wage rates is presented. 
V. Data Sourcas  and Empirical Specifications  tlsad in  This Analysis 
This paper contributes  to the empirical  literature  on  the  market structure 
hypothesis  in.  several dimensions.  First,  we analyze the  role of the  market  and 18 
bargaining structure  on  both wage settleaents  and strike  activity.  The theoretical 
development  of  the market  structure  hypothesis  eaphasired  that many variables abould 
raise  union wagea by  increasing  the union's  ability  to inflict  economic damages  on the 
firm during  a strike.  To our knowledge,  however,  no systematic  evidence exists  on the 
effect  of these  variables on  the level of strike  activity.  Second,  we  develop several 
new measures  for the structure  of  union  coverage.  These new variables further  refine 
our understanding  of  the market  structure  hypothesis.  Finally,  we  estimate our 
specificstions  using a  broader sample  of firms over a larger  number of years than  the 
samples  used in  previous  studies. 
Msny of  our additional  measures of the  structure  of  union coverage  are derived 
from  s large  psnel data set  of  union negotiations  that  has been collected by  the 
authors  in conjunction  with David Card and Sheens  Mcconnell.  This data set consists 
of  all  contract  expirstions  from 1970 to present  that  were listed in  issues of  the 
Sureau  of Labor Statistics  (BLS) Bargaining  Calendar.  The BLS supplies an 
identification  number,  which provides  s  panel structure  to the data, making it 
possible to follow a  bargaining  pair through  esch successive  negotiation.  The firm 
and union name, the number of  workers  covered  by  the contrsct,  the two-digit  industry 
clsssificstion,  and a  bargaining  structure  vsrisble  are provided.  From unpublished 
ZLS contrsct  listings  we  were able to obtain  the four-digit industry  classification. 
The  bargaining structure  variable indicates  if the bargaining  unit consists  of  a 
single  firm/single  plant, single  firm/multiple  plant,  association  agreement,  or 
industry/area  agreement.  The BLS stopped  reporting  the employer  unit variable in 
1984.12 
The following  methodology  was used to create  union coverage  and bargaining 
structure  measures  for the years used in  our analysis.  Details  are provided in  Abowd 
t1prior to 1979 the  publication  was called  the Wage Calendar. 
'2The unpublished  BLS contract  listings  still indicate the employer  unit 
classification. We  are in the process  of  gathering  these data for contracts 
expiring from 1984 to 1987. 19 
and Tracy (1987).  The employment number  associated  with each contract expiration  is 
meant to reflect the  number of  workers covered  as of the beginning of the contract. 
We linearly interpolated  between these employment  figures  for each negotiation  by  a 
given bargaining  pair in our data.  This gives us month by month estimates of the 
employment associated  by  each contract  in  the sample.  Union coverage  measures  were 
constructed  by  first obtaining  total monthly  employment  counts for each  union/industry 
pair in the data.  These monthly  sums were then used to construct annual  averages. 
The total  union coverage  in  an in  stry  for a particular  year can then  be calculated 
as the  sum of the individual  union annual  averages  divided  by  the total  industry 
employment.  For any particular  contract  negotiation  in our sample,  we  can decompose 
the total union coverage into the percent  covered  by the union involved  in the 
negotiations  and the percent  covered  by  other  unions.  In  a  similar  manner,  we  can 
calculate  for each industry  and year the distribution  of union membership  by  type of 
bargaining  structure. 
The strike  sample  consists  of  contract  negotiations  in  manufacturing  that 
occurred  between  1970 and 1980.  Although it would be desireable to follow  up  on Rees' 
suggestion  and analyze  both manufacturing  and nonsnanufacturing  industries, 
nonmanufacturing  contracts  were dropped  from the sample  since no  sales concentration 
data are available.  While the employer  unit data is available through  1983,  the 
estimates  of  the distribution  of union membership  by  type of  bargaining structure 
begin to reflect  the missing  data as early as 1981,  For a three  year contract 
expiring  in 1984,  employment  figures  would  be  incorporated  into our calculations  from 
1981 to 1984.  To  minimize the effect  of the missing  data on estimates  of the 
distribution  of union membership  by type of  bargaining structure,  the yeara from  1981 
to 1983  were dropped  from the analysis. 
Three sources  of  data were used to infer if  a negotiation  involved  a strike.  The 
BLS publication  Industrial  P.elations Facts provides  a weekly  summary  of  strikes  in 
progress  using information  gathered  from  a  variety  of public sources,  The 8LS 1ork 20 
Stoppage  file,  which is compiled  from confidential  surveys aent to firms and unions, 
was used although  some care is requited  since the public  use version available  to 
researchers  deletes the  names of the firm  and union.  The third source is a  listing  of 
strikes  compiled  by  the  Bureau  of  National  Affairs,  Inc.  (BNA).1' The process  used to 
merge this strike information  into  rhe  contract  data is detailed in Tracy (l986)J4 
The  wage settlement  analysis  was based on  a sample of  collective  bargains 
reported  by  the ENA in  Collective  Bargaining  Negotiations  end Contracts.  These 
reports  were published  between  January  1976 and December  1980.15  The twA data report 
the wage rate,  scheduled  deferred rhanges  and contingent  COlA information. We  used 
a  measure  of the wage settlement that suamarizes  the expected  annual  rate of growth  of 
the contract  wage rate from the last  day of the old contract  until the  last  day of the 
naw contract.  This measure is based upon the deferred  scheduled increases  and the 
1These  data are called  the Work Stoppage  Data  by  the twA.  They are 
compiled  by a group of  reporters from a  variety of public  sources  and 
interviews,  The data were provided  by Harriet  Berlin of  the twA. 
4As  might be  expected,  the three sources  did nor always  classify  a 
negotiation  in the  same manner,  In 90% of the cases,  all three sources 
provided the same classification.  The incidence  of strikes in the  sample 
varies  considerably  depending  on  the level of agreement  we require  among the 
three  sources.  If  we  code a strike  when g  sources  indicates  a strike,  then 
the strike  incidence rate  is 16.53%.  If  we  code a strike  when any two sources 
indicate  a strike,  then the strike  incidence  rate falls to 11.62%.  Finally, 
if  we code a strike  only when gg  sources  indicate,  then the  strike 
incidence  rate falls to 6.64%.  The greatest  degree  of classification 
divergence  is between the twA data and the two BLS data sources.  The 
robustness  of the strike  results to the  particular definition  of  a  strike  used 
is discussed  below. 
15The computerized  version  of the BNA  wage settlement  data are available 
through  1987,  however,  the time period  from 1976 to 1980 is the maximum 
overlap  with measures  developed  from our  current Bargaining  Calendar files. 
16The actual  wage rate reported  depends  upon the contract  and the 
reporter  who records the information  at the MA,  For about two-thirds  of  the 
contracts  the  wage rate reported  is either  the last  wage rate in  the previous 
contract  or the first wage rate in the  new contract for a representative 
member of the  bargaining unit (e.g. journeymen  operatives in  the automobile 
pacts).  For the other third of the contracts  the  wage rate is taken from 
published BLS data for the industry. 21 
expected  COLA  increases  given information  available  on  the date of  sett1ernent)7 Wage 
settlements  were linked to the industry,  union and  state data using the  same codes 
that were used for the contract expiration  sample. 
Import  penetration  data  were developed  by  Abowd (1987)  and are discussed in  Abowd 
and Freeman (1987).  The data were based on the BLS  Trade Monitoring System four-digit 
Import  Standard Industrial  Classification  method)8 BLS data are available for the 
period  1972 to 1981.  Abowd's series  run from 1958 to 1984.  The import  penetration 
ratio is defined  as the  import  Sh.  based value of  imports  divided  by the comparable 
value of domestic  product shipments  (product  class coded)  plus value of imports.  The 
measure  corrects the value of domestic  product shipments  so  that only the group of 
products  most comparable to the  products included  in the  import  SIC  based value of 
imports  are used. 
Conditions in the  industry  and local  labor markets  may exert important influences 
on  the wages written into  new contracts  and  on  the difficulty encountered  in 
negotiating  them.  We include  variables that control  for the employment  growth. 
current  conditions,  and level  of  uncertainty  for each labor  market.  These variables 
were derived  from the  time  series  regression  on  industry  and state quarterly 
employment,  not seasonally  adjusted19 
17See Abowd (1987)  for a  complete  description  of  these data and the 
methods  used to summarize  the  expected  wage changes. 
18See Schoepfle (1982)  for  methods.  Original  sources for these data are 
Bureau  of the Census  publications  U.S.  Commodity  Exports  and Imports  as 
P,elated to  Output  and Annual Survey  of  Manufactures:  Value of Product 
Shipments. 
19The input  time  series  data  were extracted from  BLS computer tapes 
Employment  and Earnings:  National  and Employment and Earnings:  State and  Area. 22 
(1)  In  E.  +  + i2T2 +dijD. 
+ 
Uit  P1 Uj1  + p2 U.2 + 
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Data from 1958 to 1987 were used when available.  Otherwise, equation (1) waa 
eatimated  using data froa 1972 to 1987.20 The employment  growth  rate La calculated 
using estimates for il  and i2 The current  condition in the labor market is 
calculated to reflect both the seasonal employment  affect as well as the predicted 
component  of the current employment residual.  Finally,  the overall level of 
employment  uncertainty  in  each labor market  is  proxied  by  the mean square  error from 
21 
equation  (1). 
An important  feature  of  our study i5 the detail  used to describe  the extent and 
nature  of unionism in  the industry.  A  criticism  of  many empirical  studies  of  union 
wage determination  is that the extent  of unionism  is controlled  with a  single overall 
coverage  variable.  The two studies  reviewed  in  the previous  section  made some 
important  advances.  Hendricks (1975)  adjusted  coverage  to reflect  spatial limitations 
in  the labor market.  In  addition,  Hendricks  distinguished  between industry  and 
regional labor  market coversge.  bUshel (1986)  decomposed  the overall  coverage into 
the  percent  covered  by  the  major union and the percent  covered  by  all other unions. 
This yielded  qualitatively  similar  results  as using overall  coverage and a Herfindahl 
index  of  coverage  concentration. We  introduce  several  new variables into the 
analysis.  These variables are  meant more fully to reflect  whether the union has 
organized  the relevant  work  force and the extent  to  which competitive  unionism is a 
problem. 
2Dgeries  that begin in  1972  were analyzed  using only a linear trend. 
21Tracy (1987)  tests current  gsme theoretic  bargaining  models of  strikes 
by  including  a  firm-apecific  measure  of uncertainty  calculated  as the standard 
deviation  of  the "excess"  stock  returns  over a one year period  preceding the 
expiration  of  the  existing  collective  bargain.  This restricts the ssmple  to 
firms that are traded  on a  major exchange  and eliminates  all bargaining pairs 
that uU  association  agreements.  For  this reason,  we have chosen  to use the 
industry  level measure of  uncertainty  discussed in the  text. 23 
A limitation  with all current  measures  of  union coverage is that they ignore  the 
labor content  of  imported  goods,  which is by  definition  outside the scope of  American 
labor law protection  of  the unions  ability to organize.  While Mishel (1986)  included 
an import  penetration  ratio (IPR)  in  his analysis,  he did not attempt to adjust the 
union coverage  numbers to reflect import  competition.  If  we  are willing to assume 
that domestic  union workers (LJ).  domestic  nonunion DN'  and foreign  workers 
(LF) 
are equally  productive,  then  we can adjust the conventional  coverage  numbers in a 
simple  manner  Let k  denote the cownon  average  productivity  of  labor,  Recall that the 
import  penetration  ratio is defined  as: 
(2)  IPR — 
where  S —  Value  of  domestic  shipments,  and 
H —  Value  of  imports. 
Let C denote the conventional  union coverage  measure  and C the trade-adjusted  union 
coverage  measure. 
3  C  LDU 
4C  LDU  C) 
The  relation  between  the  two  coverage  measures  can be seen by  expressing the 
numerator and denominator  of  the  IPR in terms of  the implied  labor  content,  Ignoring 
exports,  we have H  — k(L.f)  and S +  H — 
k(LDU 
+  LDN + L.),  which implies: 
L 
(5) IPR—  F 
LDU + 
LDN + LF 
Combining  expressions  (3)  through  (5)  gives that C — (1 
-  IPR)C.  The  same technique 
was  used  to  adjust  the  sales  concentration  figures  to  account  for  imports. 
Since  we  know the union(s)  involved  in any particular  negotiation  in our samples, 
a  natural question  to ask is  whether the union coverage  measure should  reflect the 24 
percent  of  the industry  employment  organized  by  any union or organized  by  the 
particular  union(s) in  question.  We diaaggregate  the total coverage into  theae two 
components.  Finally,  controlling  for the level and composition  of the  union coverage 
implicitly  assumes that  only the level and not the composition  of  the uncovered work 
force is important.  Recall  that the uncovered  work force consiata  of  domestic 
nonunion  workers  and foreign  nonunion  workers.  Since the threat  of unionization  will 
only apply to the  first  category  of  nonunion  workers,  the composition  of  the  nonunion 
work force may be  important. To allow for this pcssiblity,  we include the IPR as a 
separate  variable  as well as interacting  (I 
-  IPR)  with the coverage  measures.22 
Nishel (1986)  proxied the degree of  industrial  competitiveness  with the percent 
of  the industry  workers  organized  by  the largest  union.  Since we have decomposed 
overall  coverage into a  union-specific  and a  general  component,  we  will use a 
Herfindahl index of union coverage  to proxy for the degree  of fragmentation.  In 
addition,  we  also include  a  variable that  measures  the relative  weight that a 
particular industry  has in the  distribution  of  a  union's  overall  membership. 
Specifically,  we  control  for the  percent  of  the union's  total membership  that is 
organized  in the industry  in question.  Holding  the level and concentration  of 
coverage  constant,  we  expect  that  unions exert more influence in their primary 
industries, 
The BLS contract  data allow  us  to calculate  the distribution  of  union workers in 
an industry  over four types of  bargaining  structures:  single firm/single  plant, 
single  firm/multiple  plant,  association  agreement,  and industry/area  agreement.  In 
the strike  analysis  we also  know the specific  structure  of  the  contract that is being 
renegotiated. This additional  information  was incorporsted  in the analysis in several 
forms.  The  most strsight  forward  manner is to include  indicstors  for each type of 
22flishel (1986)  included  the IPR in  his specification  on  the grounds  that 
the  variable helps to control  for the  competitive  pricing  pressures put on 
firms that operate in  industries  with significant  import  ectivity.  The 
coefficient  on  the IN  will reflect  both this effect  end the composition 
effect discussed in the text. 25 
contract-specific  structure.  The allows  us to ascertain  if the contract-specific 
structure is important  holding  constant  measures of the industry-specific  structure. 
An alternative  specification  is to code an  indicator  variable for the case  when  the 
contract-specific  structure  is the same as the dominant  structure  observed in the 
industry.  If  the dominant  structure  reflects  the most appropriate  structure for that 
industry,  then there may be  gains to a  union from  being able to adopt that particular 
structure  in its bargaining. 
VI. Empirical Results  for Strike  Activity 
The analysis  of strike  activity  focuses  on  3,575 contract  expirations  in the 
manufacturing  industries  over the period  1970 to 1980.  We model the incidence rate  of 
strikes  at contract  negotiations. Other sources  of strike  activity,  such as 
organization  drive strikes  and strikes  during  the life of an existing  agreement,  are 
not included in this  study.23  Table I presents summary  statistics  for the bargaining 
units in our strike  activity  sample.  These statistics  are simple  averages  of 
bargaining  units.  Overall there  is a 17.85%  strike  incidence  rate in  the sample. 
We  conducted  a logistic  regression  analysis  of the strike  incidence  rate 
controlling  for the  variables listed  in Table  1.  The specification  was varied by 
removing  (column  1) and including  unrestricted  year effects (columns  2 and 4) and 
unrestricted  two-digit  industry  effects (columns  3  and  4).  The results  are reported 
in  Table 2.  Rather than display  logistic  regression  coefficients,  which are 
inherently  difficult to interpret  due to the  nonlinearity  of  the  logistic  regression 
function,  we report the marginal  effect of  each control  variable  on  the  probability  of 
a strike,  holding all other variables  at their mean values.  These marginal  effects 
can  be  interpreted  like standardized  regression  coefficients--the  effect of  a  one 
standard  deviation  change in  the control  variable on  the probability  of  a strike. 
235ee  Tracy (1986)  for a detailed  discussion  of the focus on strike 
incidence  at contract  negotiation. 26 
Table 2  shows that the  estimated logistic  regressions  are remarkably insensitive 
to  whether or not  we  include  year effects  and industry  effects.  Hence,  we  interpret 
only column (1), which includes  neither.  Incresses  in the trade-adjusted  four firm 
concentration  ratio are weakly  assoclared  with lower strIke  rates,  Increases  in  the 
trade-adjusted  coverage  by  the same union have a strong  positive  effect on strike 
rates.  Increases in the trade-adjusted  coverage  by  other unions  has only a weak 
positive  effect.  Increases  in import  penetration  have a  weak negative effect on 
strike  races.  As the  Herfindahl index of  union coverage increases  the strike rare 
goes down.  Similarly,  as the  percent of the  union's total  membership chat is in the 
industry  increases  the strike  rate goes down.  The percent of an ndusrry'a  workers in 
association  agreements  is related  to lower strike  races.  The ocher bargaining 
structures  are nor different  from rhe reference  structure--single  firm/single  plant. 
The effect of  having  the same bargaining  structure  as the industry  dominant one ia 
negative,  but statistically  imprecise.  The growth  rate of industry  employment and the 
current industry  employment  residual  are both associated  with increaaed  atrike 
activity.  State employment  growth  and residual  effects  are not statistically  precise 
or economically  lsrge.  Industry  employment  root mesn square is associated  with a 
higher strike  probability,  while state employmenr  root  mean square  error is not 
important. 
To check for the sensitIvity  of  our results  to the definition  of  a strike  used, 
we re-estimated  the basic strike  specification  for each possible  definition.  Recall 
that  we  have three separate  sources  of  strike  information:  Industrial  Relations Facts 
(IRF),  Current  Wage Developments  (CWD),  and  Work Stoppages (WS).  When strikes  are 
coded  baaed on the IRF data alone,  the industry  employment  mean square error and the 
IPR lose their significance. When strikes  are  coded based on  the CWD data alone, the 
industry  employment  growth  rate is  no  longer  significent  and the industry/area  and 
single  firm/multiple  plant bargaining  structures  have significantly  lower strike 
incidence.  When strikes  are coded based on  the WS data alone,  the sales concentration 27 
loses  its significance  and the effect  of coverage  by  other unions is doubled  in 
magnitude.  Finally,  when strikes  are coded based on  agreement  between at least two 
data  sources,  then the industry  employment  mean square  error and the sales 
concentration  variables lose their significance. In  addition, single  firm/multiple 
plant bargaining structures  have a significant  negative  effect. 
There are important  nonlinearities  in  the strike incidence  rate equations  The 
negative  marginal effect of  the trade-adjusted  four firm concentration  ratio declines 
in  magnitude as the concentration  Lises.  Table 3 displays this relation  by  evaluating 
the marginal effects  at various  levels  the concentration  ratio.  The marginal effect 
of the percent of the union's  total membership  in the same industry  as the  bargaining 
unit is negative for low levels  of the variable  but positive for  high levels.  Again, 
Table 3  displays  this relation. 
VII.  Empirical  Results  for Wage Settlements 
The analysis  of  wage settlements  focuses  on 3,485 contract  settlements  in the 
manufacturing  industries  over the period  1976 to 1980.  The measure  of wage settlement 
used is the expected  average  teal wage rate over the life of the new contract.  This 
measure  is defined  as the nominal  wage rate expected  to hold during  each year of  the 
contract  inclusive  of  scheduled  deferred  increases  and expected  COLA payments  divided 
by  the expected  Consumer  Price Index during  that year.24  We model the natural 
logarithm  of the expected  reel wage rate.25  Table 4 presents  summary  statistics for 
245ee Abowd (1987,  Appendix)  for a detsiled  description  of  the methods. 
The expected inflation  rate used to calculate  the expected  COLA payments is 
the rate that prevailed  during the twelve  months  that preceded the wage 
settlement.  The expected  COLA payments  are based on  industry  and year 
specific  linear  COLA formulas  and only apply to contracts  known to  contain 
contingent  COLA agreements. 
25The logarithm  has been multiplied  by  100 and all proportions  have been 
entered  as percentages  to simplify  the display  of  regression coefficients  and 
marginal  effects.  Estimated  coefficients  retain the  interpretation  of 
elasticities. 28 
the  bargaining units in  our wage settlement  sample.  These statistics ate employment 
weighted averages  of the batgaining  units. 
The regtession  analysis  of  wage settlements  is shown in  Table 5.  As  in out 
sttike  models,  we estimated  equations that included  no unrestricted  affects (column 
1),  unrestricted  year effects (column  2), unrestricted  two-digr  industry  effects 
(column  3),  and both sets of  unrestricted  effects  (column  4)  ,  Regression  coefficients 
or marginal  effects  that are unaffected  by  the removal  or  inclusion  of these 
unrestricted  effects  may be  interpreted  unambiguously.  Regression coefficients  that 
change depending  upon which sets of unrestricted  effects  are included  require  more 
cautious  interpretation  because  we  csnnot  distinguish  these  effects  from general  time 
or industry  pstterns.  All equations  were estimated  using weighted least squares  with 
bargaining  unit  weight proportional  to bargaining  unit sire.  This technique  allows 
one to interpret the coefficients  as the average  over all  bargaining units for the 
representative  worker,26  The specification  displayed  in Table 5 is quadratic in  most 
of the interesting  market  structure  variables  with trade-adjusted  four firm sales 
concentration  interacted  with the main union coverage  variables.  Because this 
specification  is  very nonlinear,  Table 6  presents  estimated  marginal  effects at 
varying levels  of  the control  variables.  The marginal  effects in  Table 6  have the 
same interpretation  as  linear  regression  coefficients-  -namely,  they are the partial 
derivatives  of the regression  surface  evaluated  at the indicated  points.  The 
discussion  of  our results  will reference  Tables  5 and  6 together. 
Wage settlements  increase  as the trade-adjusted  four firm concentration  ratio 
increases  at  low levels of  sales concentration. The reverse is true at  high levels  of 
261f the regression included  only an intercept,  then the employment 
weighted estimated  intercept  would be the average  increase  for all unionized 
workers and  not for all  bargaining units regardless  of  size.  This technique 
allows for all the effects  to vary across  bargaining  units.  The regression 
coefficients  are the employment  weighted  averages  of these  bargaining unit 
specific  coefficients. The weighted  regression  induces  heteroscedasticity  on 
the model.  Standard  errors  were corrected  using the  White technique. 
Standard  errors  have not been corrected  for coefficient  heterogeneity. 29 
concentration. The cross-over  sales  concentration  level is sensitive  to  which sets of 
unrestricted  effects  are  included  in the model.  Table 5 shows that trade-adjusted 
four firm sales  concentration  has a  positive linear  coefficient,  negative quadratic 
coefficient,  negative interaction  with same union coverage,  negative interaction  with 
other union coverage (except  specification  1), and positive interaction  with import 
penetration. All of  these  estimated effects  are consistent  with existing  empirical 
studies,  Table 6 shows;  however, that the  marginal effects  of increased  sales 
concentration  in our specifications  are positive at iow sales concentration  levels  and 
negative at  high concentration  levels,  which calls into question  the direct 
interpretation  of the sales concentration  ratio as a  measure of quasi-rents  per 
worker 
The  marginal effect  of increases in trade-ad)usted  coverage  by  the  same  union on 
wage settlements  is positive  at all levels  of union coverage (the only  exception is n 
Table 6 is specification  2 at 67.9e coverage  and the effect  is imprecisely  estimated). 
This conclusion  is unaffected  by  the specification  or  the level at  which the  coverage 
variable is evaluated.  The marginal  effect  of increases  in trade-adjusted  coverage  by 
other unions in  the same industry  is also always  positive  and insensitive  to 
specification. The marginal  effect  of increases  in import  penetration  is  negative 
when industry  effects  are omitted (specifications  1 and 2) but it is  positive  when 
these effects  are included  (specifications  3 and 4)  Since the model is only 
estimated  using data from the  period  1976 to 1980,  most of  the large swings in  import 
penetration  do  not occur during  the sample  period.  Therefore,  it is not surprising 
that import  penetration  effects  cannot  be distinguished  from  other industry  specific 
patterns 
27 
Increases  in the Herfindahi  index  of  union coverage  concentration  are associated 
with increased  wage settlements. The magnitude  of this effect,  but not its  sign,  is 
(1986)  did not include  industry  effects  in  his equations,  so the 
robustness  of his results  to this type of specification  check cannot  be 
evaluated. 30 
affected  by  the specification. The marginal  effect of  the percent  of  total  union 
membership in the industry  is positive for  low levela  of  the variable  and negative  for 
high levels,  which ia the opposite of its effect  on  atrike  probabilities.  The result 
is not sensitive  to specification. 
Workers in industries  where a large percentage  of  the  unionized  workers are 
coveted  by  association  agreements  have somewhat  lower  wage settlements  with the 
magnitude  of the difference  depending  upon the specification,  In  particular, 
inclusion  of unrestricted  industry  effects  substantially  reduces the estimated 
magnitude.  Workers  in industries  where a large  percentage  of  the  unionized workers 
are covered  by  industry/area  agreements  have wage settlements  whose relation  to the 
reference  single  firm/single  plant group is ambiguous  (negative  for specifications 
without industry  effects,  positive  otherwise).  Finally,  workers in industries  where a 
large  percentage  of  the unionized  workers  are covered  by  single  firm/multiple  plsnt 
agreements  have larger  wage settlements  regardless  of the specification. All of  these 
comparisons  use the  single firm/single  plant agreement  as a reference.  Industry 
employment  growth  is  negatively  related to wage settlements. The estimated  effect of 
state employment  growth  is positive  when unrestricted  industry  effects  are estiaated 
(specifications  3 and 4) and negative otherwise.  The predictable  transitory componeor 
of industry  employment  growth (industry  employment  residual)  is generally  positively 
related  to wage settlements  (except  specification  3)  .  The  predictable  transitory 
component  of  state employment  growth  is always  positively  related to wage settlements. 
The estimated  effect of  industry  employment  growth  uncertainty  (industry  employment 
root mean squmre  error)  is imprecise  and inconsistent  across  specifications.  roe 
effects  of  state employment  growth  uncertainty  are always  positive. 
Consider  next the consistency  of the estimated  results  with the asymmetric 
information  synthesis  of  the effects  of  market  structure  and  union coverage  variables 
on  wage settlements  and strike  probabilities. The primary  market structure 
varimble-  -trsde-adusted four firm  sales concentration-  -may be  consistently 31 
interpreted  as proxying increased  quasi-rents  per worker at low levels  of sales 
concentration.  This is  because at low levels  of sales concentration  the marginal 
effect  of an increase  in the concentration  measure  is to increase  wage settlements  and 
decrease  strike  probabilities. This configuration  of results is only consistent  with 
a quasi-rent  per  worker nterpretstion.  At high levels of  sales concentration  the 
effect  of an ncresse  in  concentration  is to decrease  both wage settlements  and strike 
probabilities. This configurstion  of results is inconsistent  with the quasi-rents  per 
worker  interpretation. 
The primary  union coverage  variable-  -trade-adjusted  coverage  by  the same 
union-  -may  be consistently  interpreted  as proxying increased  alternative  wage rates 
for the union  workers.  This is  because at all 1.evela increases  in coverage  by  the 
same union are  associated  with higher  wage settlements  and strike  probabilities. 
Trsde-sdjusted  coverage  by  other  unions in the same industry  may also be consistently 
interpreted  as  proxying  incressed  alternative  wage rates for union  workers.  The 
pattern of its  marginal effects  is the same ss the pattern  for own union coverage in 
both the  wage settlement  and strike  probability  estimates. 
The effects  of increased import  penetration  cannot  be given a  consistent 
interpretation  because  of  the specification  sensitivity  in the wage settlement 
equations. 
Increases in the Herfind.ahl  index  of  union concentration  cannot  be  consistently 
interpreted  as proxying increases  in the opportunity  wage rate of union  workers.  This 
is because increases  in the Herfindahi  union concentration  index are associated  with 
higher  wage settlements  and lower strike  probabilities. The higher  wage settlements 
were predicted  by  the industrial  relations  theorists;  however,  the only economicslly 
consistent  way to explain the  strike  probability  result is to argue that this index 
proxies  expected  quasi-rents  per worker,  which could  be  true if  union organizing 
activity  is targeted  at  high quasi-rent  per worker industries  or firms.28  The same 
Abowd and Farber (1987)  for an analysis  of this model. 32 
interpretation  must  be  given to the percent  of total union membership in this 
industry.  This  variable has opposite  marginal  effects  on  wage settlements  and strike 
probabilities,  and these effects  change  signs at roughly  the aame level of  the 
variable in the two analyses. 
Our direct  measures of  bargaining structure,  industry  employment  opportunities 
and uncertainty,  and state employment  opportunities  and  uncertainty  generally  produced 
results  that  were too imprecise  to interpret  in the  context of the asymmetric 
information  model.  Only the  positive effect  of  the  predictable  transitory  coaponent 
of  industry  employment  gtowth  was preoisely  estimated in  both equations.  Thia is 
consistent  with the  interpretation  that this variable  proxies increases  in the 
opportunity  wage rate of  union  workers.  The effect  of the industry  employment growth 
rate,  although  relatively  precise,  was negative  in  the  siage settlement  equation and 
positive in the strike  probability  equation.  This is only consistent  with an 
interpretation  that the long run employment  growth  rate is positively  related to 
expected  quasi-rents  per  worker. 
VIII.  Conclusions 
How important  ia the market structure  hypothesis  for explaining strike  and wage 
settlement  outcomes?  Our statistical  analysis  baa ahown that  over the  decade  of the 
1970's  (late  1970's  for  wage settlements)  trade-adjusted  increases  in the four firm 
sales  ooncentration  ratio were associated  with higher  wage settlements  at low sales 
concentration  levels,  lower wage settlements  at  high  sales concentration  levela,  and 
lower  strike  probabilities  at  all sales concentration  levels.  These results are 
inconsistent  with the original  market  structure  hypothesis.  However,  the simple 
asymmetric information  model of wage settlements and  strike probabilities  suggests 
that the inconsistency may  be  due  to quasi-rents per worker  (ability to pay) not 
varying  monotonically  with sales concentration. Scherer  (1980)  summarizes  the many 
reasons  that industrial  organization  theorists  have advanced  to suggest  that this 33 
explanation  La at least plausible.  Of course,  a  direct  estimate  of  the  relation 
between quasi-rents  per worker  and trade-adjuated  sales concentration  could offer a 
more complete  explanation. 
Trade-adjusted  coverage  by the union involved  in  the negotiation  fares 
considerably  better.  This variable  is always  positively  related  to both wage 
settlements  and strike  probabilities. This result  was predicted  by the industrial 
relations  theorists  and is consistent  with the economic  interpretation  the increased 
product  market coverage  by the union increases  the alternative  wage rate faced by  that 
union's  workers 34 
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Appendix 
Al.  A Simple  Asymmetric  Information  Model of Wages  and Strikes 
In this appendix  we present a simple  one-period  bargaining  model that illustrates 
the effect of  a  set of  variables on strike  and  wage outcomes,  For simplicity  we 
assume that  negotiations  consist of a single 'take-it-or-leave-it'  wage demand  by the 
union.  If the  firm rejects  the union  wage demand,  then the  bargaining pair dissolves 
and the quasi-rents  associated  with the  pair are  lost.  That is,  the firm receives  a 
competitive  return  on  its  capital  while the union receives  the  alternative  wage for 
its  labor  services, 
At the  time of the negotiations,  the firm  knows its net revenues  (i.e.  net of all 
contractual  costs other  than  labor)  for the next  contract  period ihile the union faces 
some  uncertainty over the firm's  net revenue.  We will ignore  issues  involving 
wage/employment  tradeoffs  by  assuming  a fixed employment rule with bargaining only 
over the contract wage.  Define the following  terms: 
W  —  Alternative  wage rate  a 
W  —  Contract  wage 
P  — Revenues  net of nonlabor  costs per union  member 
We  assume  that the  union enters  into  bargaining  with the belief that the  firm's 
profitability  is uniformly  distributed  over the interval  from P1 
to h'  P — 
U[P1, 
What is the union's  optimal  wage demand? Assuming that the union is 
risk-neutral,  then,  it is straight  forward  to  write down the  union's decision  problem. 
Faced  with any  wage demand  W, the firm's  optimal  response  given the one-round  nature 
of the  bargaining is to accept W  if  W is less than or equal to P and to reject 
otherwise.  Given the union's  prior beliefs  about  F, the expected  value from any 
contract  demand W is given by 
V(W)  — "h  W]/[Ph 
- 
"11> W  +  ([W  111h 
- 'i 38 
Maximizing  V(W) over choices  of  W  leads to an optimal  wage demand  function given by 
W — Max  { 
P1,  1/2 h  + wi 
We  will focus on  the case where P1 
< 1/2 t2h 
+ W]  since this is the case which leads 
to the possibility  of  a  strike.  If  we denote  ihe maximum  quasi-rent  as Q  P.  - 
then,  the optimal  wage demand  can be rewritten  as 
W  —  W  + 1/2  Q 
That is,  the union demands  a contract  wage which is equal to the alternative  wage plus 
a fifty  percent share of the  maximum  potential  wage.  This implies  that the union's 
share  of  the  actual rent  will exceed  fifty percent  if  it successfully  negotiates a 
contract  with the firm. 
Define  the  probability  of a strike  as the probability  that the firm rejects the 
union's  wage demand.  This  probsbility  can  be  expressed in  terms of the parameters of 
the  bargaining  model by  substituting  for  the union's  optimel  wage demand. 
Pr  (1/2 2h 
-  +  1/2  W)/(Ph 
- P) 
We  are now ready to consider  the effects  of  changes in the bargaining  environment 
on  the  probability  of a strike  and the  observed  contract  wage.  First,  consider  the 
effect  of increasing  the union's  uncertainty  over the firm's  profitability  holding 
constant  the expected  size of  the  quasi-rents. This involves  taking  a  mean-preserving 
spread  of the union's  prior beliefs  about  P.  Let e be a spread  parameter (j,.g  we 
will shift up h  by e and shift down P1  by  e).  The contract  wage and strike 
probability  as a function  of e ate as follows. 39 
W(e) — 1/2  + e + %J) 
Pr(e) — [1/2 h 
- 
p1 + 1/2 W+  3/2 e] / 2h 
-  4  2e 
Evaluating the derivatives  with respect  to the spread  parameter  at the point e—0 
yields the following  results. 
dW(e)  / de — 1/2  > 0 
dPr(e)  / de — (1/2 h  ÷ 1/2 P1  Wa)/(Ph  >2 >0 
Increasing  the level of  uncertainty  over profitability,  holding  constant  expected 
quasi-rents,  leads to a higher  strike incidence  and contract  wages.  Next. 
consider  the effect of an increase  in the expected size of the  quasi-rents  holding 
constant the  uncertainty  over the quasi-rents  and the alternative  wage rate.  This can 
be  investigated  using a shift parameter  a (j.  we  shift up h  by  s and we shift up 
by  s). 
W(s)  * 1/2 'h  +  + s) 
Pr(s) —(1/2 
1'h 
-  ÷  1/2W 
-  1/2 s)/(Ph 
- 
The derivatives  with respect to  a (evaluated  at s—O) are 
dW(s) fda— 1/2>0 




Increasing the  average size of the quasi-rents  holding  tonstant the unoertainty  leads 
to lower strike  incidence  and higher contrstt  wsges. 
Finally,  consider the  effect of increasing  the  alternative  wage holding constant 
both the mean and variance  of  P.  The derivatives  with respect to  W  are  a 
dW  /  dW  — 1/2  >  0 
dPr /  dW  —  11(2  - 
P1) 
) > 0 
lmprovement  in labor market  conditions  relative  to the fin's profitability  leads to 
higher strike  incidence  and contract  wages. 
All. Summary  Statistics  for Bargaining  Structure  Variables 
Some  descriptive  information  concerning  the distribution  of bargaining  structures 
is presented in  Tables  Al through  A3.  In  Table I shows  the percent of union workers 
in  manufacturing  who were covered  by each type  of  bargaining structure.  Separate 
figures  are given for the years from 1970 to 1950.  Industry/Area  agreements  acccunt 
for the smallest  proportion  of workers  although  bargaining  units using this structure 
are large in  size.  Comparing  across  years shows that there was a decline  in  the use 
of  plant level bargaining  in  the early to mid-seventies  although this type of 
structure  regained  its lost market  share  by  l9gO.  Table A2 shows the distribution  of 
bargaining  structures  by  two-digit  industry  classification. The figures  reflect  the 
overall  average  for the industry  over the sample  period.  Distinct industry  patterns 
exist.  For example,  while Asaociation  agreements  are the least used type of structure 
in general,  they are the dominant  structure  used in  Food,  Apparel,  and Printing.  The 
Chemical  industry  is atypical  On its  heavy use of  Plant level bargaining.  Because  of 
the panel structure  of our contract  data, we can detect  bargaining  units that changed 41 
their bargaining  structure during  our sample  period.  In  total,  21.8% of  our 
bargaining  units changed structures.  The three industries  with the least stability 
were Instruments  (36.7%),  Petroleum (34.3%),  and Rubber (34.4%).  The three industries 
with the moat stability  were Apparel (10.9%),  Stone,  Clay,  and Glass (12.7%),  and 
Printing (13.2%).  Table A3  shows the empirical  transition  matrix  among the types  of 
bargaining structures.  Centralized  bargaining  structures  displayed the  most stability 
over the  period.  There was very little  movement  between Single  Company structures  and 
more centralized  structures.  Most of  the switches  occurred  between Single  Plant and 
Multiple Plant structures. Table I 
Suary  Statistics for the Strike Sample 
Variable  Mean  Standard Deviation 
Strike Indicator  17.85%  3830 
Industry Employment Growth Rate (annual)  -1.20%  2,04 
State Employment Growth Rate (annual)  1.56%  1.00 
Industry Employment Residual  (annual rate)  -3.76%  29.24 
State Employment Residual  (annual rate)  -0.32%  7.00 
Industry Employment Root  Mean  Square Error  (annual rate)  4.84%  1.84 
State Employment Root  Mean  Square Error  (annual rate)  4.12%  0.20 
Industry Union Workera n  Aaaociaton  Agreement  17.52%  28.06 
Industry Union Workers in Industry/Area Agreement  4.18%  10.25 
Industry Union Workers in  Single Firm/Multiple  Plant  42.22%  27.89 
Contract Specific  Structure Same as  Dominant Structure  55.94%  49.65 
Trade-Adjusted Four Firm Sales Concentration Ratio  37.59%  15.78 
Trade-Adjusted Coverage  By  Same Union  26.30%  23.35 
Trade-Adjusted  Coverage By  Other Unions  16.17%  19.42 
Import Penetration Ratio  6.90%  6.44 
Herfindahi Index of  Coverage  Concentration  51.52  25.12 
Total Union  Membership  in This Industry  22.23%  28.25 
N  — 3,575 
Source: Authors'  analysis of  BLS Bargaining Calendar data.  Authors'  analysis of ELS and 
ENA work  stoppage  data.  Sample period is contract expirations  occurring from 
January  1970 to  December  1980. 
42 Table 2 
Logistic Marginal  Effects for Strike Analysis 
Mode  I 
Variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Industry Empioyeent  00243  00243  0.0159  0.0112 
Growth Rate  (0.0067)  (0.0069)  (00088)  (0.0076) 
State Employment  -0.0033  0.0041  0.0051  0.0074 
Growth Rate  (0.0068)  (0.0070)  (0.0090)  (0.0077) 
Industry Ernployeent  0.0178  0.0143  0.0158  0  0118 
Residual  (0 0059)  p0.0061)  (0.0071)  (0 0062) 
State EmpLoyment  -0.0013  -0 0023  -0.0045  -0.0035 
Residual  .3 1057)  (0.0055)  (0,0072)  (0,0058) 
Industry Employment  0 G102  0 0064  -0.0003  -0.0034 
Root Mean Sq.are Error  0,0067)  (0,0065)  (0.0099)  (0,0081) 
State Employment  0.0010  -0.0023  -0.0006  -0 0018 
Root Mean  Square Error  0.0065) 
.  (0.0065)  (0.0086)  (0 0071) 
6  Industry Union Workers  -0.0293  -0.0304  -0.0090  -0.0122 
in Association Agreements  0  0094)  (0.0090)  (0.0147)  (0.0113) 
6 Industry Union  Workers  -0.0080  -00071  -0.0005  -0 0013 
in Industry/Area Agreements  (0,0077)  (0 0074)  0.0l06)  (0 0085) 
Industry Union Workers  -0 0074  -0.0071  0 0025  -0 0016 
in Single Firm/Multiple  Plant  (0,0087)  (0 0085)  (0.0113)  (0.0094) 
Contract  Specific Structure  -0.0178  -0.0145  -0 0103  -00075 
Same as Oominant Structure  (0.0106)  (0.0218)  (0 0247)  (0.0274) 
Trade-Adjusted  Four Firu  -0.0098  -0.0104  -0,0158  -0 0115 
Sales Concentration  Ratio  (0.0085)  (0,0082)  (0 0119)  (0 0094) 
Trade-Adjusted  Coverage  0,0583  0.0573  0.0435  0 0329 
By Same Union  (0.0090)  (0.0088)  (0.0123)  (0,0103) 
Trade-Adjusted Coverage  0.0191  0.0177  0,0081  0.0033 
By Other Unions  (0.0066)  (0.0064)  (0.0093)  (0 0078) 
(continued) 
43 Table 2 (continued) 
Logistic Marginal  Effects For Strike Analysis 
Variable 
Model 





















%  Of Total Union Membership 









Year Effects Included 
(degrees of freedom9) 
No  Yes  No  Yes 
Industry Effects Included 
(degrees of freedoml9) 
No  No  Yes  Yes 
LogLikelihood  -1611.64  -1,586.56  -1,552.44  -1529.72 
N  — 3575 
tn  Note:  Marginal  effects for all continuous variables reflect the change  the probability 
of  a strike resulting from a one standard deviation change  in the variable:  Matginal 
effects for qualitative variablea reflect the change in the probability  of  a sttike 
resulting from a  change of the variable from a value of  zero to one.  All mstginal 
effects are evaluated at sample means of  the data.  Standard  errors are given in 
parenthesea. 
44 able 3 
Logistic Marginal  Effects for Variables  With 
Linear  and Quadratic Teras in Strike  Analysis 
Variable  Percentila  Level 
ode1 
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of Total Unn 
Mesbership tn 
This  Industry 
1 
2,  ...5% 
-0 1332 
'0 0269) 






-0  1020 
(0  0290) 
-0.0967 
(0.0276) 
-0  1551 
0.j541 
-0  188 
(0..J209) 







,0  209) 






0  0019 
(0.0076) 








Year  Effects 
Included 
No  Yes  No  Yes 
Industry Effects 
Included 
No  No  Yes  Yes 
a  Note  Marginal  effects reflect the change  in the probability of  strike resulting  from a 
one standard deviation change in  the variable  indicated  All other variables are 
evaluated at sample means,  Standard errors are given in  parentheses. 
45 Table 4 
Summary Statistics  for the Wage Settlement  Sample 
Variable  Mean  Standard Deviation 
Natural logarithm of average real wage (x 100)  119.59  2647 
Industry Employment Growth  Rate (annual)  -1.56%  182 
State Employment Growth Rare  (annual)  1.41%  0.79 
Industry Employment Residual  (annual rate)  9.36%  29.38 
State Employment Residual  (annual rate)  2.82%  7,52 
Industry Employment Root Mean Square Error  (annual rate)  1.70%  1.74 
State Employment  Root Mean  Square Error  (annual tate)  4.15%  0.25 
Industry Union Workers  in Association Agreement  7,84%  20.38 
Industry Union Workers in  Industry/Area  Agreement  7.89%  21.53 
lndustry Union Workers in  Single Fitm/Mu1tple  Plant  53.77%  30.68 
Trade-Adjusted Pour Firm Concentration  Ratio  44.61%  18.90 
Trade-Adjusted Coverage by Same Union  29.82%  30.29 
Trade-Adjusted Coverage by  Other Unions  17.69%  16.55 
Import Penetration Ratio  9.76%  4.36 
Nerfindahi  Index of  Coverage Concentration  52.79  26.78 
Total Union Membership in  This Industry  54,40%  34.30 
N —  3,485 
Source: Authors'  calculations based on  8NA  Collective Bargaining  Negotiations  and Contracts 
data.  Authors'  calculations based  on SLS Bargaining  Calendar  data.  The  contracts 
reported  in the table were settled between January  1976 and  December  1980. 
Statistics  are weighted  by  the size of  the bargaining  unit. 
46 Table  5 
Regression  Coefficients  for Wage Settlement Equation  0sirg 
Quadratic Model  with Interactions 
Variable  (1)  (2)  (3 
Industry Employment  -1.3913  -l 1726  -09526  -2 06'E 
Growth Rate  (0.5046)  '0 4743)  (06292)  (0 6164) 
State Employment  -09197  -0 7702  1.1907  0.7782 
Growth Rate  (0.5li,  (0.3235)  0.-.557)  (0.463) 
Industry Employment  0 0325  0 1353  -C'  0476  0,0301 
Residual  (0.0139>  0  9l°6)  (0.0148)  .0 lIla) 
State Employment  i laSS  0  2796  0 1580  0.1851 
Residual  0  526,  (0 3499)  (0.3154)  3.0440) 
Industry Emplavmenr  3.0371  -0.'-098  0,4533  -0 1754 
Root Mean Square  Error  )  2641  .u 2729)  '0 2191)  '32615) 
State  Emploiment  9.llcl  9.1268  3 7437  2,7092 
Root Mean  Square Error  1.5680)  (1.5785)  (l.60,  1.5605) 
Indastry UnIon Vorkers  -.3  3261  -0,2146  0 3527  -0 "I2 
in  AssocIation Agreemects  0.0269)  '1.0286)  0  0316)  0,326 
¼ Industry Union  Workers  -0.2176  -8.3051  0)283  0 c27 
in  Industry/Area Agreements  (0 0246)  (0.0231)  (0.3289)  (0,0293) 
¼ Industry Union  Workers  0.1412  0.1240  0 3921  0.0714 
in  Single Firm/Multiple  Plant  (0.0161)  (0,0153)  (0 0178)  (0 0173) 
Trade-Adjusted  Four Firm  0.8058  0.9446  0 2444  0.3132 
Sales Concentration  Ratio  0.2723)  .0.2529)  (0 2837)  ,0 2914) 
Sales Concentration Ratio  -0.0185  -0.0176  -0.0045  -0 0030 
Squared  (0.0029)  (0,0026)  (0 0031)  (0.0030) 
Trade-Adjusted  Covetage  0.6399  0.5391  0.7059  0,5361 
by Same Union  (0.1018)  (0.0944)  (0.0840)  (0.0874) 
Coverage by Same Union  -0.0009  -0.0033  0.0002  -0,0014 
Squared  (0.0006)  (00006)  (0.0006)  (0.0006) 
Coverage by  Same Union  -0.0048  -0.0023  -0 0095  -0.0072 
times Concentration Ratio  (00O19)  (0.0018)  (0.0017)  (0 0016) 
(continued) 
47 Table 5  (continued) 
Regression Coeffcienta  for Wage Settlement Equation  Using 
Quadratic Model with Inreracrons 
Variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Trade-Adjusted Coverage  0.0975  0.0671  0.4267  0,3208 
by  Other Unions  (0.1382)  (0.1240)  (0.1324)  (0.1317) 
Coverage by  Other Unions  -0.0059  -0.0035  -0.0033  -0.0007 
Squared  (0.0013)  (0.0012)  (0.0010)  (0.0010) 
Coverage by  Other Unions  0.0102  -0.0051  -0.0013  -0.0057 
times Concentration  Ratio  (3.0033)  (0.0030)  (0.0029)  (0.0027) 
import Penetration Ratio  -5.9236  -5,2129  -0.8135  0.2953 
(0.5679)  (0.5108)  (0.5843)  (0.6352) 
import Penetration Ratio  0.0618  0.0449  -0.0097  -0.0233 
Squared  (0.0129)  (0.0087)  (0.0132)  (0.0167) 
import Penetration Ratio  0.0933  0,0919  0.0328  0.0096 
times Concentration  Ratio  (0.0105)  (0.0099)  (0.0093)  (0.0096) 
Nerfindahi  Index of  Union  0.1076  0.1366  0.0140  0.0531 
Coverage  Concentration  (0.0283)  (0,0278)  (0.0363)  (0.0376) 
% of Total Union Membership  0.2659  0.2046  0.1734  0,3342 
In This industry  (0.0611)  (0.0585)  (0.0535)  (0.0521) 
% Union Membership in  -0.0025  -0.0017  -0.0014  -0.0010 
Industry Squared  (0.0006)  (0.0005)  (0.0005)  (0.00.35) 
Year Effects included  No  Yes  No  Yes 
(degrees of freedo-4) 
Industry Effects Included  No  No  Yes  Yes 
(degrees of  fteedo19) 
Standard Error of  Equation  15,0426  14.2929  11,9448  11.4792 
Adjusted  R-aquated  0.6770  0,7084  0.7963  0,9119 
Error degrees of freedom  3461  3457  3442  3438 
N  — 3485 
Note:  (a) The remaining variables  in all  models are identical to the ones used in  Table  6. 
(b) The equations were estimated using weighted  least squates with  weights proportionaL 
to the size sf  the bargaining unit.  Standard errors  (in parentheses) have been 
corrected for the hetetosced.aaticity  induced by the weighting. 
(c) The standard error of  the equation and the adjusted R-squared  are based  on 
conventional least squares formulas. 
48 Table 6 
Marginal  Effects for VarIables that Enter the wage Settlement  Equation 
In Nonlinear  Form, Based on  a Quadratic Model with Interaction Terms 
Percentile 
Model 
Value  (2)  (3) 
mean  44,6% 
(1) 
0  1036 
(0 0439) 
10  21 1%  0.9697 
'0.  1588) 
25  31 8%  0.5755 
(0.1003) 
53  39.1%  3,3065 
(0,  06  39) 
75  63  1%  -0  5822 
(0  0978) 
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0.7365 
(0.0942) 
-0  0275 
(0.1196) 
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cean 
10 
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0.3% 
0  3744 
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49 Table  6 (continued) 
Marginal  Effects for Variables  that Enter  the Wage Settlement  Equation 
In  Nonlinear Form,  Based on  a Quadratic Model with Interaction Terms 
Model 
Variable  Percentile  Value  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Trade-Adjusted  mean  17.7%  0.3424  0.1695  0.2507  0.0608 
Coverage by Other  (0.0564)  (0.0540)  (0.0540)  (0.0585) 
Unions  in This 
Induatry  10  4.2%  0,5022  0.2633  0.3389  0.0610 
(0.0817)  (0.0782)  (0.0686)  (0.0708) 
25  7.6%  0.4624  0.2400  0.3170  0.0559 
(0.0747)  (0.0715)  (0.0641)  (0.0669) 
50  14.9%  0.3754  0.1889  0.2689  0.0450 
(0,0608)  (0.0583)  (0.0562)  (0.0603) 
75  23,0%  0.2795  0.1327  0.2160  0.0329 
(0.0497)  (0.0477)  (0.0514)  (0.0564) 
90  31,9%  0.1742  0.0709  0.1578  0.0196 
(0.0463)  (0.0442)  (0.0524)  (0,0572) 
Import  Penetration  mean  9.8%  -0.5631  -0,2472  0.4575  0  6700 
Ratio  (0.1384)  (0.1371)  (0.1510)  (0.1570) 
10  3,9%  -1.2837  -0.7703  0,5702  0.9415 
(0.2179)  (0.1747)  (0.2580)  (0.2969) 
25  6.3%  -0,9815  -0.5510  0.5230  0,8277 
(0.1736)  (0.1520)  (0.2061)  (0.2273) 
50  11.0%  -0.4051  -0,1325  0.4328  0,6504 
(0.1377)  (0.1378)  (0.1396)  (0. 1452) 
75  12.2%  -0.2534  -0.0224  0.4091  0.5532 
(0.1442)  (0.1417)  (0.1358)  (0. 1452) 
90  13.2%  -0,1331  0.0649  0,3903  0.5079 
(0.1538)  (0.1470)  (0.1382>  (0.1531) 
(continued) 
50 Table 6  (continued) 
Marginal  Effects for Variables that Enter  the Wage Settlement  Equattcn 
In Nonlinear  Form, Eased on  a Quadratic Model  with Interaction bros 
of Total  Union 
Mesbership In 
This  Industry 
Year Effects 
Included 
sean  54.3%  -00013  0.0218  00204  0  0284 
(0.0157)  '0.0151)  (0.0145)  (0.0141) 
10  1.1%  0.2603  0 2008  0.1702  0 20 
'0 059%)  0,oS73)  (0 0524)  '0 0510> 
25  20 2%  0 1666  0.1367  0  1165  0.0949 
0  0392)  (0.03'5)  (0.0344k  (0.0333 
50  c6 2%  -D 0602  -O 0164  -0. 3113  0.0c51 
(0.0228)  (0.0219)  0.026)  (0.0200) 
'5  '8.9%  -0 i22  -0 362  -0 0491  0.0197 
0 0350,  0.0335)  0 0311)  (0.0303 
30  lj.6%  -0 1801  0 :004  0 082"  -0 044 
3 G7  34)-j  '1  0415)  D.OG6; 
Industry Effects 
Inciuded 
No  No  Yes  Yes 
Note: Marginal  effects are partial derivatives of the estraated  regression equatiOn  avaluated 
at the values of  the  variables indicated  ifl  the  /a1ue colu  and at the average  a1ees of 
all other varcooles.  The estImation  results are reported in  Table 5,  Standard  errors (in 
parentheses) have been corrected  for the hetereced.asticity  induced by the weightrg 
Si 
Model 
Variable  Percentile  Value  (1)  (2)  (3) Table Al 
Annual  Distribution of  Union Membership 
in  Manufacturing  industries 
By Type of Bargaining Structure 
Number of 
Single Company/  Single Company/  Association  Industry/Area  Workers 
Yeer  Single Plant  Multiple  Plant  Agreement  Agreement 
1970  31,34%  47.14%  18.78%  2.74%  4.26 
1971  26.37  53.39  17.18  3.06  4.28 
1972  23.26  55.76  17.80  3.18  4.27 
1973  22.14  57.33  17.08  3.46  4.40 
1974  24.12  55.49  17.26  3.12  0.41 
1975  24,31  55.19  17.13  3.36  4,32 
1976  26.37  51.38  17.80  4.44  4.18 
£977  2902  4926  1757  415  94 
1978  30.93  48.17  16.76  4.14  3.78 
1979  32.51  47.07  16.33  4.10  3.67 
1980  32.98  47.56  16.18  3.27  3.74 
Note:  Figures do nor include contracts with  missing bargaining  structure  information. 
52 Table A2 
Industry 0istributon  of  Union Membership 
gy  Type of Eargaining  Structure 
Single Company/  Single Company!  Association  industry/Area 
Industry  Single  Plant  Multiple  Plant  Agreement  Agreement 
Food  1935%  2565%  43.34%  11.66% 
Tobacco  46.37  52.89  0,73  5.70 
Textile  35,75  22.54  23.03  18.67 
Apparel  1.82  12.71  76.82  8.65 
Lumber  15.57  38.86  28.48  17.09 
Furniture  31.74  37 49  29.42  1.34 
Paper  46.11  41.10  6.97  5.82 
Printing  15.48  6.42  72.l  5.90 
Chemicals  66.77  33.12  0.11  0.00 
Petroleum  39,54  60.45  0.00  0 50 
Rubber  22.68  73.72  3.60  0.50 
Leather  25.92  33 42  29.66  11.00 
Stone, Clay, Class  19.02  63.67  12.56  4.74. 
Primary Steel  20.49  76.90  1,40  1.22 
Fabricated  Steel  43.72  43 40  11,04  1,84 
Machinery Ex  Elec  42.90  54.53  2.29  0.28 
Electrical  Equipment  41.85  55.69  1.16  1.30 
Transportation  Equipment  26.94  69.77  2.71  0.59 
Instruments  48.78  51.22  0,00  0.00 
Misc. Mfg.  29.18  31.77  31.05  7.99 
Note:  Figures do not include contracts with  missing bargaining  structure  information. 
53 Table A3 
8argaining  Structure Transition  Matrix 
For Manufacturing Industries 
Subsequent  Bargaining 
Structure 
Initial Bargaining  Single Company!  Single Company!  Association  Industry/Area 
Structure  Single Plant  Multiple Plant  Agreement  Agreement  All 
Single Company/  655  182  11  3  851 
Single Plant  (76.97)  (21.39)  (1.29)  (0.35) 
Single Company!  104  338  9  7  458 
Multiple  Plant  (22.71)  (73.80)  (1.97)  (1.53) 
Association  9  5  210  12  236 
Agreement  (3.81)  (2.12)  (88.98)  (508) 
Industry/Area  5  0  5  60  70 
Agreement  (7.14)  (0.00)  (7.14)  (85.71) 
All  Types of  773  525  235  82  1,615 
Agreements 
8ote:  The  unit of  observation  is a  bargaining  pair.  The numbers in parentheses are 
percents  of  row  totals. 
54 